Locke asserts that "the Ideas of primary Qualities of Bodies, are Resemblances of them, and their
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Bennett and Curley sweep resemblance under the rug by asserting that Locke is merely obscurely reiterating what he said in § §11-14. Such an approach does not judiciously confront the resemblance theses. Locke does believe that all and only those qualities that resemble ideas explain the workings of perception, but surely he does not suppose that is what the word 'resemblance' means.
According to a third interpretation, resemblance is just accuracy of representation. An idea of a quality resembles that quality in a body just in case the body has that quality. A. D. Woozley (1964, (34) (35) ) advances this interpretation in the introduction to his edition of the Essay. 8 As Michael Ayers points out (1986, 21f.), such an interpretation domesticates Locke's notion of resemblance and avoids the baffling implication that anything in the mind actually takes on a shape when we contemplate that shape.
On Woozley's reading (1964, 34) , when Locke denies that the ideas of secondary qualities resemble the corresponding qualities, he denies that bodies actually have secondary qualities. However, we may be confident that Locke believes that some objects actually are red, some are loud, and some are bitter. He repeatedly asserts that secondary qualities are powers to produce ideas in us (at 2.8.14, 15, 23, 24, 26 and elsewhere); for example, a fire's heat and color are its powers to produce the corresponding ideas (2.23.7). Since fire manifestly does have these powers, it follows on his account that it is hot and red. We may infer that something is wrong with Woozley's account.
I should say on Woozley's behalf that Locke does not think that snowballs are white in the primary sense of 'white'. Nor does Locke think that the idea of white represents them as well as the idea of round does. Nevertheless, he does believe that the word 'white' applies to snowballs in a derivative sense and that the idea of white represents them adequately enough. Understanding why he believes that snowballs are not white in the primary sense and why he believes that they are imperfectly represented by the idea of white requires understanding why he believes that nothing in snowballs resembles the idea of white. That will have to wait until we understand what he means by resemblance.
Literal Resemblance and a Veil of Imagery
To determine what Locke means by asserting that ideas can resemble something in bodies, we should determine what sort of mental entity the relevant ideas are supposed to be. The revisionist suggestion from John Yolton and others that Locke is a crypto-direct realist has spawned a vast secondary 5 literature. 9 I do not want to go into this debate except to say that I entirely agree with Nicholas Wolterstorff's assessment of the evidence: "What emerges is that certain passages are ambiguous. All the clear ones, however, seem to me to be in favor of the interpretation of ideas as mental objects" (1996, 16n). 10 Given the state of the evidence, I say that we should embrace the traditional interpretation.
Locke believes that ideas are intermediate entities between the world and us and that these ideas constitute a veil of appearance epistemologists have to reckon with. We should take him seriously when he tells us that "the Mind knows not Things immediately, but only by the intervention of the Ideas it has of them" (4.4.3). We should also take him seriously when he asks, "How shall the Mind, when it perceives nothing but its own Ideas, know that they agree with Things themselves?" (ibid.) I will explain Locke's answer in §3 after setting up a literal interpretation of the resemblance theses.
Some Lockean ideas are mental images and some of them are not. A text that shows this nicely is at 4.3.19. Locke tells us that geometrical "diagrams drawn on Paper are Copies of the Ideas in the Mind, and not liable to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification." In contrast, we cannot use written copies of our "moral Ideas, we have no sensible marks that resemble them, whereby we can set them down" (see Ashworth 1984, 69-71) . 11 Any mental entity you can draw a picture of is an image.
Lockean ideas of figures are images of figures, something like the images cast on the back wall of a camera obscura (2.12.17).
Recognizing the importance of images among Lockean ideas moves us towards a sensible literal interpretation of the resemblance theses. It is easier to see how Locke can believe in square mental images than to see how he can believe in square thoughts. I want to consider two initial difficulties with this line of interpretation before arguing that the positive resemblance thesis, taken literally, is a plausible doctrine in Locke's intellectual environment.
The first difficulty is that focusing on mental imagery restricts our inquiry to ideas received through sight. For the most part, this is not an obstacle to understanding the resemblance theses. Since
Locke believes that sense organs other than the eyes produce mostly ideas of secondary qualities, there is no need to figure out what he means by saying that these ideas resemble something in bodies; he says nothing of the sort. If we must speculate, perhaps Locke hypothesizes that his opponent thinks of smells, 6 tastes, sounds, and warmth as stuffs and thinks of having the idea of one of these qualities as a matter of having some of that stuff in the brain or in the mind.
Though it is somewhat idle to wonder what Locke would mean if he said that ideas of non-visual secondary qualities resembled something in their causes, my focus on imagery does threaten to neglect the idea of solidity, since he believes that we get that idea only through touch (2.3.1). I do, in fact, believe that solidity poses special difficulties for his account. You may, in turn, suspect that solidity poses special difficulties for my interpretation of his account. In any case, I promise to address the quality.
The second difficulty is that images are primarily of things and not of qualities of things. When
Locke discusses his paradigmatic resembling ideas, ideas of figure, he gets over this difficulty through loose use of language. We ought to distinguish between, for example, a square, which is a regular foursided polygon, and a squareness, which is a quality that inheres in a square. 12 Squares have four sides, but a squareness is not the sort of thing that can have sides. Since both the geometrical entities that bodies resemble and the geometrical qualities that bodies possess may be called figures, Locke can slide between the two by discussing the ideas of triangle, circle, and square as if they were ideas of qualities.
This kind of slide is more difficult to make with other qualities. To make sense of Locke's treatment of some ideas as images, we need to find some connection between images and simple ideas.
Ayers offers the helpful proposal that "simple ideas are not so much parts as aspects of what is presented in experience" (1991, 1:17) . Unfortunately, the texts he cites in defense of his interpretation are at best inconclusive (ibid., 1:49-51). Still, the reading has its attractions, including the more congruous interpretation of the positive resemblance thesis that flows from treating simple ideas of qualities as aspects of more complex images. If some simple ideas are aspects of images, just as qualities are aspects of bodies, it will be easier to make sense of a resemblance between a simple idea and a quality.
I should admit that most of what Locke says suggests that simple ideas are components of complex ideas and not aspects of them (for example, at 2.2.2 and 2.11.6). His belief that we construct complex ideas out of the raw data of the senses guides some of his remarks (2.2.1). On the other hand, if we follow
Locke's instructions, we will think of a visually received idea of a refrigerator as an image. I find it difficult to think of the ideas of rectangle, white, unity, existence, and height as literal parts of that image. I suspect that his blanket use of the term 'idea' fosters looseness in his theory.
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By saying that a complex idea strictly resembles a body with respect to F, I mean that the idea is 
2).
A pattern is an exemplar from which copies are supposed to be made. Not every aspect of the pattern is usually supposed to be copied, but at least one attribute should belong to the exemplar and the imitation, at least approximately. Perhaps this point is otiose. After all, the term 'resemblance' itself connotes that the resembling objects share or come close to sharing some attribute. Still, the connection between resemblance and exemplification drives the point home.
Most commentators have resisted literal interpretations of the resemblance theses, in part because they think that on such an interpretation the positive resemblance thesis would be too crazy to for Locke to believe. 13 An interesting exception is Ayers. He believes that Locke intends the positive resemblance thesis literally, but Ayers hates the thesis thus interpreted so much that he only indirectly attributes it to Locke. After criticizing the Yoltonian interpretation of Lockean ideas, he writes, the notion of 'resemblance' between ideas and qualities, and the remark that 'A Circle or Square are the same, whether in Idea or in Existence', now take on a disturbing ambiva-
lence, being open both to the 'charitable' [Yoltonian] interpretation and to one which is considerably more problematic (1991, 1:64-65).
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What is it about the interpretive ambivalence that Ayers finds so disturbing? I suggest that his caution and his distress result from attributing an opinion to Locke that he takes to be not just mistaken, but inconceivable.
I personally do not think that Locke's opinion is especially scandalous, but that does not matter.
For exegetical purposes, the important question is not whether the positive resemblance thesis, literally interpreted, seems crazy to us, but whether it would seem crazy to a competent seventeenth century philosopher. In fact, at the time, it is a perfectly ordinary view. In the next sub-section, I defend this assertion by describing the traditional view that mental images are figures traced upon the organ of the soul. I begin by describing Aristotle's treatment of corporeal imagery, since his ghost haunts Locke's philosophy, and I go on to describe an exchange between Gassendi and Descartes on the subject. I finish the subsection by explaining Locke's idiosyncratic reaction to this background.
Literal Resemblance and Corporeal Images
Locke is taught Aristotelian philosophy at Oxford and he teaches it to students as a tutor. He does not appreciate this philosophical education much, but some of it sticks. In On Memory and Recollection, Aristotle declares that memory is the possession of something "like a sort of picture" (450a25-30). 14 He seems to think that this picture is mechanically produced, since he calls it "a sort of imprint, as it were, of the sense-image" and says that it is produced by perception "as people do who seal things with signet rings" (450a30-31). 15 Aristotle's cautious language suggests that he may be speaking metaphorically, but the piece of speculative physiology that follows these statements resists such an interpretation. He conjectures that this is also why memory does not occur in those who are subject to a lot of movement, because of some trouble or because of their time of life, just as if the change and the seal were falling on running water. In others, because of wearing down, as in the old parts of buildings, and because of the hardness of what receives the affection, the imprint is not produced. And this is why the very young and the old have poor memory, since they are in a state of flux, the former because they are growing, the latter because they are wasting away (450a32-450b6).
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Aristotle surmises that this sort of consideration can also explain why neither the clever nor the dimwitted have good memories, "for the former are too fluid, the latter too hard. Therefore with the former the image does not remain in the soul, while with the latter it does not take hold" (450b8-450b10). If this is a flight of metaphor, it is a long and acrobatic one (see Sorabji 1992, 221).
I do not mean to suggest that this is all that Aristotle believes that there is to memory. In book one of De Anima, he asserts that anger has matter and form. Its matter is "the boiling of the blood and hot stuff round the heart" while its form is "a desire for retaliation or something of the sort" (403a31-34 Gassendi believes that ideas of extended things must resemble the things they represent. Descartes paraphrases Gassendi's challenge as a request to explain "how I think that I, an unextended subject, could receive the semblance or idea of a body that is extended." He replies temperately that the mind does not receive any corporeal semblance; the pure understanding both of corporeal and incorporeal things occurs without any corporeal semblance. In the case of imagination, however, which can have only corporeal things as its object, we do indeed require a semblance which is a real body: the mind applies itself to this semblance but does not receive it (ibid., 2:265).
He takes Gassendi's talk of resemblance literally, and he does not treat the challenge as if it were foolish.
In his response, Descartes alludes to his theory that the soul inspects corporeal images on the pineal gland. In the earlier Treatise on Man, he asserts that the rational soul directly considers figures "which are traced in the spirits on the surface of gland H [the pineal gland] . . . when it images some object or perceives it by the senses" (ibid., 1:106). 16 Gassendi and Descartes's belief that the mind sometimes contemplates a literally extended cor- For our purposes, we should note his statement that he will not examine whether any or all of our ideas depend upon matter.
Instead of the physical consideration of the mind, Locke proposes to use what he calls a "Historical, plain Method" to "consider the discerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ'd about the Objects, which they have to do with" (ibid.). Judging by the book that follows this proposal, the historical, plain method consists in examining the evidence provided by tales about other cultures, anecdotes about the blind and mad, observations of children and animals, and careful and skeptical introspection. It does not include the dissection of the eye or brain, nor does it include positive conjectures about the relations between mind and body or ideas and animal spirits.
Locke's declaration that he will not pursue the physiology of the mind is remarkable since he knows more about physiology than his peers. As J. R. Milton observes (1994a, 39), "he was alone among the major philosophers in coming to the mechanical philosophy from medicine". Locke's knowledge of medicine teaches him modesty (see Yost 1951, 129).
John Norris, an English Malebranchian, wants Locke to say whether he believes that ideas are corporeal, asserting that until the nature of ideas is explained "all further Discourse about them is but to show them what but will not tell you whence they came nor whither they go nor what they are made of and yet you must be examined to all those particulars whether they be real beings or no, in the next place whether they be substances or modifications of substances and whether they are material or immaterial substances and then upon their being material you must answer to an hundred solid questions (Locke 1971, 10-11).
All right, then. An idea is an immediate object of perception and, as such, "can be no other but such as the Mind perceives it to be" (2.29.5). Even so, ideas have their mysteries, mysteries that Locke does not believe that the plain historical method can solve. 18 He does not pretend to know whether ideas are corporeal.
Since corporeal images possess primary qualities and Locke does not think it absurd that ideas might be corporeal images, he does not think it absurd that ideas might possess primary qualities. Conceding that much does not yet concede that Locke could rationally unconditionally believe the positive resemblance thesis. I say that he straightforwardly believes that ideas of primary qualities resemble primary qualities, and I say that he believes that ideas may be incorporeal. In order for my interpretation to be right, he must countenance the possibility that incorporeal ideas possess primary qualities
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Four considerations, side by side, convince me that Locke does not reject the possibility that primary qualities might inhere in incorporeal ideas. First, the possibility that ideas might possess primary qualities is in the intellectual culture and rejecting that possibility outright would require taking a stand on a question that seems insoluble to Locke. Second, the laws of logic do not demand that everything extended be corporeal. After all, the images cast by a slide projector are extended and incorporeal.
(I call these images incorporeal since their colors do not inhere in any body. The screen remains white throughout the slideshow; light is not paint.) Third, Locke is an unusually imaginative philosopher. He may have been the first human being to think of the inverted spectrum (2.32.15), a child raised in a black and white world (2.1.6), and multiple souls undetectably animating a single person (2.27.10, 13). Fourth, the point of view that makes it hardest to conceive of extended incorporeal ideas is the point of view that Locke refuses to adopt. Using introspection or the other tools of the plain, historical method, a philosopher can raise up a mental image and consider it as extended and shaped. A much harder task: thinking of the soul as an immaterial substance with ideas as its immaterial modes while imagining that these modes might somehow be extended. For the most part, Locke refuses to take up this point of view, except to illustrate the limits of human understanding. Perhaps people cannot know more by willfully closing their minds to certain perspectives. Nevertheless, they can imagine more that way.
I am not asking the reader to imagine that mental images are extended and shaped. I am asking the reader to imagine that Locke believes that mental images are extended and shaped. All of this is groundwork. I want to prepare the possibility that he has this belief so that when I present supporting texts, they are not dismissed or reinterpreted.
Literal Resemblance and Particular Primary Qualities
Locke explicitly asserts that figures exist in ideas just as they exist in bodies. Someone might retort that this resemblance is irrelevant. Though three images may be three in number in the same sense as three mice, an image of three mice is just one image. True enough, but an image of three mice is threefold in a certain way; it has three salient parts. Perhaps this is not enough for strict resemblance, but it puts the relation between an image of three mice and three mice within the outer limits of literal resemblance. Notice that not all things that represent multiplicities resemble their objects in this way. The phrase 'the Chicago Seven' represents seven people, but it does not contain seven salient parts.
We may also take the positive resemblance thesis literally when it comes to motion, though
Locke has a complicated account of the perception of motion. He gives the following example of the idea of motion at work: "A piece of Manna of a sensible Bulk, is able to produce in us the Idea of a round or square Figure; and, by being removed from one place to another, the Idea of Motion. This Idea of Motion represents it, as it really is in the Manna moving" (2.8.18). On a quick reading, one might think that this supports Woozley's interpretation. The idea of motion properly represents the fact that the manna is moving. Locke, however, does not say that the idea of motion represents the manna as the manna really is. He says rather that the idea of motion represents motion as motion really is. How does the idea of motion represent motion so aptly?
Locke's most interesting treatment of the perception of motion occurs in his chapter on duration.
He wants to show that the idea of duration does not necessarily depend upon the idea of motion. 19 He begins by asserting that if we are to see a motion as motion, it needs to produce "a continued train of distinguishable Ideas" (2.14.6). The individual ideas in this succession do not suffice to produce the idea of motion (ibid.); the individual ideas in any succession, however made, "include no Idea of Motion in their Appearance" (2.14.16).
Locke tells us that witnessing two bodies moving relative to one another at a moderate pace produces a succession of ideas in our minds. He implies that the idea of motion is an aspect of one of these trains of ideas, though not of any individual idea in the train. I suggest that Locke has a film reel conception of the appearance of motion. No individual frame in the reel has the appearance of motion, but, as played out in the theater of mind, the sequence of frames does. If we take this conception of the idea of motion and consider it in light of Locke's assertion that motion is "nothing but change of distance between any two things" (2.13.14), 20 So there is a possible Lockean view according to which incorporeal ideas may be taller than they are wide although they are not measurable in inches. On this view, ideas literally resemble bodies with respect to taller than wide but not with respect to 1/4 of an inch wide. Should the advocate of such a view say that ideas literally resemble bodies with respect to extended? I think so. I would rather admit that there are extended things that cannot be measured in inches than admit that anything non-extended is taller than it is wide. Philosophers whose ontology includes the unit circle from analytic geometry probably consider that circle to be an extended thing not measurable in inches.
The Lockean view I have been sketching may be Locke's view. It is possible, however, that he adopts a more extreme line. In a later response to Norris, he writes that "an idea of a circle, of an inch diameter, will represent, where, or whensoever existing, all the circles of an inch diameter; and that by abstracting from time and place" (1823, 10:250). 21 Is it possible that we should take the punctuation seri-ously and that Locke intends to assert that some ideas are an inch wide? I would not put it past him.
Although the rules of punctuation are not settled in the 17 th century, his description of the representation of size here echoes his description of the representation of shape at 4.4.6 of the Essay, and there, as we have seen, he emphatically asserts that ideas share geometrical properties with bodies.
However, we cannot say that Locke unreservedly believes that ideas strictly resemble bodies with respect to determinate size, since that would exclude the possibility of corporeal ideas. Though I do not suppose that reason demands that extended incorporeal ideas be in physical space or even in any space at all, corporeal ideas are just images traced on the organ of thought and thus cannot be larger than the brain. No one could possibly maintain that a circle and a corporeal idea of a circle could be both four feet wide in the very same sense; the human skull is not big enough for that. I conclude that the phrase "the idea of a circle, of an inch diameter" expresses a mere tendency in Locke's thought. It does not establish that ideas are incorporeal on his considered view any more than his reference to characters drawn on the brain establishes the opposite. His earlier reply to Norris makes it clear that Locke's considered answer to the question "Are ideas corporeal?" is "I don't know."
Locke is conspicuously silent about whether the idea of solidity literally resembles solidity. In fact, he does not mention solidity in the section containing the resemblance theses or in the preceding four sections defending the corpuscularian theory of perception. This means that he does not include an account of the production of the idea of solidity. Moreover, these sections contain four distinct lists of primary qualities that explain the production of ideas, and solidity is missing from them all.
On reflection, we should not expect Locke to say explicitly whether the idea of solidity literally resembles solidity. Since he believes that solidity is pretty much definitive of corporeality (2.4.2, 3.10.15), to settle that question would be to settle the question of whether the relevant ideas are corporeal. As we have seen, Locke intends to avoid the topic.
On my reading of the texts and the gaps in the texts, Locke wants to assert that ideas literally resemble bodies with respect to shape, and he wants to reserve judgment on whether they literally resemble bodies with respect to solidity. If this reading is right, then he is making conceptual room for a new thing, a mental image that is both literally shaped and incorporeal.
3 Locke's Theory of Representation
Literal resemblance matters to Locke; it plays a part in his explanation of how we can think about external things. As I have said, he believes that there is a serious question about how the mind can know that its ideas correspond to anything out in the world. He answers his own question by trying to
show that "two sorts of Ideas … we may be assured, agree with Things" (4.4.3). 22 The first sort comprises simple ideas that correspond to the outside world by a causal connection. These Mind, will hold true of them also, when they have a real existence in Matter" (ibid.). Admittedly, these considerations alone do not show that any triangles reside in the external world, but Locke has said enough to offer an account of the possibility of applied geometrical knowledge.
He has also said enough to explain why he believes that ideas that represent through resemblance reveal more about bodies than ideas that represent solely through being an effect. By contemplating a resembling idea, we can think of a body as it is in itself. By contemplating more than one resembling idea, we can think how bodies relate to one another, independently of the ways that they affect our Chappell 1994, 53-54). Though Locke puts less emphasis on resemblance, it is a more promising source.
Ideas that resemble bodies do not just provide us with the knowledge that some object has the power to produce a certain idea, they also provide us with objective, instructive, universal knowledge of the world beyond the veil of appearance.
Locke is not the first to place resemblance in the center of a theory of representation. In On Memory and Recollection, Aristotle wonders how a memory can represent an absent object. He thinks that considering the less puzzling case of a "figure drawn on a panel" can ease the mystery. Such a drawing "is both a figure and a likeness, 23 . . . and one can contemplate it both as a figure and as a likeness" (450a21-24). Aristotle believes that the images of memory represent other things "in the same way." Just as a drawing is a figure and a likeness, "one must also conceive the image in us to be something in its own right and to be of another thing. In so far as it is something in its own right, it is an object of contemplation or an image. But in so far as it is of another thing, it is a sort of likeness and a reminder" (450b24-27). The word Sorabji translates as 'image' is 'phantasma'. 'Phantasm' is one of three philosophical terms Locke offers as acceptable substitutes for the word 'idea' (1.1.8). I take it that Aristotle and Locke are saying the same thing.
According to James Gibson, Locke believes that ideas are "essentially representative" (1917, 20) .
Gibson argues that "a 'psychical fact' which is not the apprehension of an object is for [Locke] a sheer impossibility" since "to have admitted it would have been to run directly counter to the principle which was fundamental for his conception of mind, that 'to be in the understanding is to be understood'" (ibid.). 24 
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Gibson's interpretive argument does not have persuasive force. We may grant that Locke believes that every idea is in the understanding and thus that every idea is understood. He is not therefore committed to the proposition that every idea represents something. On the contrary, Locke believes that the ideas of pain and sickness do not intrinsically represent anything outside themselves. 25 According to him, they are merely unpleasant sensations that befall us.
In fact, Locke's chapter on the reality of our knowledge implies that he believes that ideas represent in virtue of contingent relations between them and the outside world. He argues that our ideas signify external entities (and therefore can be constituents of real knowledge) because they happen to stand in the relations of causation and resemblance to external bodies. Simple ideas have a certain etiology and can thus represent their causes. Some ideas share geometrical features with external bodies and can thus represent their patterns. Since Locke believes that we build representation out of such contingent relations, he cannot believe that ideas represent merely in virtue of being ideas.
The Justification of the Resemblance Theses

Locke's Perspective
According to Locke, then, ideas of primary qualities represent through resemblance. Such considerations do not prove that images have colors in the same sense as statues. 26 Nevertheless, Locke needs to offer a justification for his asymmetrical treatment of the resemblance of ideas.
Look at the problem from his perspective. Imagine that you believe that the immediate objects of perception are ideas and that these only problematically and extrinsically represent external things. Contem-
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plating this field of ideas, you perceive some shapes, motions, colors, and sounds Think of this as a matter of perceiving that certain shapes, motions, colors, and sounds inhere in your ideas. Which of these features resemble qualities outside your head and which do not?
Adopting Locke's point of view and posing this question not only helps us understand his reasoning, but also helps us understand his use of language. Because he starts with ideas and reasons his way outward, he takes color words, sound words, and so on to apply in their primary sense to ideas. 27 He concludes that images do not possess secondary qualities in the same sense as bodies. If a twentieth century philosopher were to think that bodies do not resemble images with respect to color, he might express this thought by saying that whiteness and the like are in bodies but not in our minds. Locke, in contrast, says that whiteness is in our minds but not in bodies. He argues that the idea of light, as opposed to the cause of the idea of light, is called 'light' in the primary and strict sense (3.4.10). This is odd usage, but he emphasizes the point.
Locke answers the question of what the world beyond our ideas is like by declaring that ideas of primary qualities resemble something in bodies and ideas of secondary qualities do not. We can comprehend how he reaches these conclusions if we recognize that he believes that the veil of ideas creates a presumption against thinking that anything in bodies resembles anything in the mind. Locke offers considerations for setting this presumption aside for primary qualities, and argues that no similar considerations justify setting it aside for secondary qualities.
The Justification of the Positive Resemblance Thesis
Let us first consider what leads Locke to say that ideas of primary qualities resemble something in bodies. The main reason he adopts the positive resemblance thesis is that he believes that it follows from the corpuscularian theory of perception. If primary qualities are involved in the production of sensations, and we can perceive those very primary qualities inhering in our field of ideas, then it really is easy to draw the consequence that ideas of primary qualities resemble qualities of bodies.
Although it follows from his theory of perception that bodies possess primary qualities, we might still wonder whether Locke is entitled to conclude that they exist in bodies in same sense that they exist 22 in ideas. Since he believes that simple ideas represent either by being effects or by being similar, we can see why he chooses similarity. If ideas of primary qualities were mere blank effects that told us nothing about the workings of bodies, then corpuscularians could not take the first steps towards a theory of perception. At bottom, Locke's conclusion rests on his difficulty in seeing how we could represent the intelligible qualities of bodies if our ideas do not resemble those qualities.
Someone might deny that the argument has any merit, even while conceding the conditional proposition that if the corpuscularian theory of perception is true, then external bodies resemble ideas with respect to primary qualities. After all, if we are seriously calling the objectivity of primary qualities into question, we cannot pretend at the same time to be certain of the truth of corpuscularianism. Bennett puts the point harshly:
It is true that Locke tries to confute the sceptic by covert appeals to empirical evidence; but even he would see that in the context of the anti-sceptical debate-the veil-of- Someone who believes in a veil of perception has to put her best foot forward in judging what lies beyond that veil. Appealing to the conceivability and intelligibility of a physical hypothesis is a perfectly legitimate response to such a predicament. Locke does not think that we can be certain of the truth of corpuscularianism; at his most cautious, he writes merely that it "is thought to go farthest in an intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Bodies" (4.3.16). Bennett is quite right to insist that Locke would not appeal to such a theory to refute someone who denies that we can have certain knowledge. Nevertheless,
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since he believes that this hypothesis makes the most sense of experience, he is within his rights to assume its truth for the different project of determining what the world beyond our ideas is like.
A second reason for believing that primary qualities exist out in the world is that they cannot be separated from matter (2.8.9). Locke's assertion that primary qualities are inseparable from bodies comes almost immediately before his defense of the corpuscularian theory of perception. The structure of the chapter thus allows that he might draw his positive resemblance thesis partially from his inseparability thesis.
In his discussion of inseparability, Locke denies that matter, by presenting us with misleading ideas, only appears to have primary qualities. He puts some effort into assuaging this concern. In case we worry that our hands and eyes deceive us into thinking that figure, bulk, and solidity are out in the world, he assures us that "the Mind finds them inseparable from every particle of Matter, though less than to make it self singly be perceived by our Senses" (ibid.). In case we worry that this reasoning is just groundless theorizing, unconnected to the empirical world, he assures us that primary qualities are "such as Sense constantly finds in every particle of Matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived" (ibid.). If If you find it improbable that someone might reach a conclusion about the nature of our ideas from such considerations about inseparability, consider an earlier 17 th century treatment of primary and secondary qualities. In "The Assayer," Galileo declares that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape; as being large or small in relation to other things, and in some specific place at any given time; as being in motion or at rest; as touching or not touching some other body; and as being one in number, or few, or many. From these conditions I cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of the imagination (1623/1957, 274).
Like Locke, Galileo cannot conceive of a body without thinking of primary qualities, and again like Locke, he can conceive of it without thinking of secondary qualities. Galileo "does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary accompaniments" to a body "that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, and of sweet or foul odor" (ibid.). Immediately after these statements, he derides secondary qualities by asserting that "without the senses as our guides, reason or imagination unaided would probably never arrive at qualities like these" (ibid.). From his capacity to think of bodies without secondary qualities, Galileo seems to infer that we derive our ideas of secondary qualities from the senses.
He also seems to infer that all such ideas are mere blank effects. Just as Locke compares the generation of our ideas of secondary qualities to the production of a pain by a fire (2.8.16), Galileo compares their generation to the production of a ticklish sensation by a feather (ibid., 275-77).
Locke owns Galileo's works (Harrison and Laslett 1965, 140), and Boyle, Locke's mentor in corpuscularianism, learns Italian in order to read them in the original language (Stewart 1991, xii). David R.
Hilbert observes that these passages from The Assayer are "a striking anticipation of Locke" (1987, 3), but we should be careful. Locke agrees that mere blank effects cannot represent qualities that are inseparable in the relevant sense. On the other hand, he rejects Galileo's assumption that ideas of secondary qualities are psychologically second-rate in virtue of coming from the senses. According to Locke, ideas of primary qualities also come from the senses (2.4 and 2.5). If he is to give us any account of how ideas of primary qualities allow us to perceive the inseparability of primary qualities, he must find some other feature of these ideas that makes them more than mere blank effects. Resemblance is in the air, so he picks that.
We should return to the problem of solidity. As we have seen, because of the intelligibility of corpuscularianism and our inability to conceive of the separation of primary qualities from matter, Locke concludes that ideas of primary qualities represent especially well. Since he can see how ideas of figures could accomplish this feat by literally resembling the corresponding qualities in bodies, he explicitly states that they do and also states that the ideas of primary qualities generally resemble the corresponding qualities in bodies. Because Locke wants to avoid committing himself on the corporeality of ideas, he is elusive on whether the idea of solidity literally resembles something in bodies.
I suggest that if Locke became convinced that images are incorporeal, then he would say that when he calls an idea of solidity a resemblance of the quality, he is using the word 'resemblance' as an honorific, an honorific chosen because of its literal application to shape, number, and motion, but in its application here signifying no more than that the idea of solidity represents especially well. In this eventuality, Locke would be without an explanation of how the idea of solidity represents, but perhaps he would be unashamed of his ignorance. After all, he does say that the topic of the reality of our ideas "seems not to want difficulty" (4.4.3), and he never claims to be a happy genius who knows or ought to know everything.
The Justification of the Negative Resemblance Thesis
Let us now turn to the negative resemblance thesis, that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble anything in bodies. Locke denies that bodies possess such qualities in the same sense as ideas and believes that this is the claim that readers will resist. According to him, secondary "Qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those Bodies, that those Ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a Mirror; and it would by most Men be judged very extravagant, if one should say otherwise" (2.8.16). Indeed, Locke considers this the chapter's main thesis. While apologizing for his "Excursion into Natural Philosophy" in a book devoted to the human understanding, he excuses himself by claiming that the digression is "necessary, to make the Nature of Sensation a little understood, and to make the difference between the Qualities in Bodies, and the Ideas produced by them in the Mind, to be distinctively perceived, without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them" (2.8.22). Locke cannot be attempting to correct the sloppiness of philosophers who have muddled the concepts of idea and quality; he would not need to discuss natural philosophy to make that point. Besides, no philosopher in history has been sloppier in his use of the terms 'idea' and 'quality'. Rather, he draws the distinction between ideas and qualities so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that [ideas] are exactly the Images and
Resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of Sensation being in the Mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the Names, that stand for them, are the likeness of our Ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to cause in us (2.8.7).
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Thus, Locke's main goal in his discussion of primary and secondary qualities is to show that secondary qualities are not out in the world in the same sense that they are in the mind. Berkeley's position that no idea could resemble a quality in an unthinking substance does not seem to occur to him. He worries only about the opponent who maintains that our ideas of secondary qualities do resemble qualities existing outside our minds.
As I said before, I take Locke's argument to be as follows: the veil of ideas establishes a presumption against thinking that anything like our ideas of secondary qualities inheres in bodies. Nothing about these ideas overcomes this presumption. Therefore, we should not believe that ideas of secondary qualities resemble anything in bodies.
Colors, smells, tastes, and sounds only make their entrance at the end of the corpuscularian story of perception. Locke believes that we have no reason to think that anything like our ideas of them exists outside the mind. We do not need to appeal to secondary qualities to explain the workings of perception, and we do not find them inseparable from bodies. A critic who accepts Locke's theory of perception cannot object that we directly see, smell, taste, or hear that external objects are white, stinking, sweet, or loud, since, according to that theory, the immediate objects of perception are ideas. As we have seen, these ideas do not intrinsically represent anything outside themselves.
To persuade his reader that ideas of secondary qualities are subjective states that have nothing in common with their causes, Locke compares these ideas to pains. He asserts that this comparison reveals the possibility that a cause might not resemble its effect, since it is no more impossible, to conceive, that God should annex [ideas of color and smell] to such Motions, with which they have no similitude; than that he should annex the Idea of Pain to the motion of a piece of Steel dividing our Flesh, with which that Idea hath no resemblance (2.8.13).
A little later, he tries to show that the idea of warmth and the idea of pain are phenomenologically continuous by imagining someone getting closer and closer to a fire (2.8.16).
With this similarity between the ideas of warmth and pain in hand, Locke argues that no compensating difference allows the reader to conclude that the ideas of color and temperature resemble some- is a presumption against thinking that they are features of snow, strictly speaking. This presumption would be overcome if attributing the qualities to bodies did some explanatory work, but in the present case, the primary qualities of the snow produce all the relevant ideas. Locke offers the same presumptive challenge two sections later. He tells us that since pain, sickness, sweetness, and whiteness are "all effects of the operations of Manna, 28 on several parts of our Bodies, by the size, figure, number, and motion of its parts," it follows that his opponents need to explain "why the Pain and Sickness . . . should be thought to be no-where, when they are not felt; and yet the Sweetness and Whiteness . . . should be thought to exist in the Manna, when they are not seen nor tasted" (2.8.18). Locke believes that no such reason can be provided and thus that we ought to believe that sweetness and whiteness are not, in the strict and primary sense, out in the world.
Near the end of the chapter, Locke offers a diagnosis of "the Reason of our mistake" in believing that ideas of color, sound, and heat resemble something in their causes. 29 The diagnosis rests on a comparison between the sun's production of ideas in us and its production of other effects in bodies. When a fair face is sunburned red, we are not tempted to think that the sun is also red, since the sun does not look red. As Locke puts it, "when we see Wax, or a fair Face, receive change of Colour from the Sun, we cannot imagine, that to be the Reception or Resemblance of any thing in the Sun, because we find not those different Colours in the Sun it self" (2.8.25). In contrast, we cannot compare the ideas that the sun produces in us with the sun itself, so we jump to the conclusion that our ideas resemble something in their cause. Because of our inability to discover any unlikeness between the Idea produced in us, and the Quality of the Object producing it, we are apt to imagine, that our Ideas are resemblances of something in the Objects, and not the Effects of certain Powers, placed in the Modification of their primary Qualities, with which primary Qualities the Ideas produced in us have no resemblance (ibid.).
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We cannot directly inspect the qualities in the object; our ideas get in the way. True, on Locke's considered view, we cannot directly perceive the external bodies involved when the sun burns a fair face. In spite of that, we can set the image of the sun next to the image of the face and compare. Through this comparison, we may indirectly compare the external bodies. No similar proxies are available for a comparison between the idea of a secondary quality and its cause.
A Consequence of the Negative Resemblance Thesis
I said before that Locke believes that bodies possess colors, tastes, and the like in a derivative sense. I should say enough about this derivative sense to avoid the difficulty that besets Woozley's interpretation. That is, I should explain how I think that Locke avoids the implication that bodies do not possess secondary qualities. He recognizes that ordinary judgments about secondary qualities are useful (4.2.14), and he thinks that he can make them into a source of knowledge (4.4.4). He accomplishes this by appealing to the notion of extrinsic denomination from scholastic semantics. Aristotle and his medieval students teach that some things, such as climates and apples, can be called 'healthy' in a derivative sense in virtue of making organisms healthy in the primary sense (see, for example, Metaphysics, IV.2 1003a34-b1). Locke believes that apples are red in the same sense that they are healthy; that is, they produce something red in the paradigmatic sense.
The strongest evidence for this is Locke's repeated assertion that we "denominate" bodies from our ideas of secondary qualities (2.8.15, 16, 22, see also Ayers 1991, 1:63-64). In 17th century English to say that one thing is denominated from another is to say that the word for the first thing is derived from the word for the second. In fact, this talk is close to being scholastic technical language for the derivative reference that I have described (Spencer 1628/1970, 142).
Locke's semantic trick turns ordinary judgments about secondary qualities into knowledge. If our only acquaintance with a body is with the idea of blue that the body produces, we can still be certain that the body is blue, at least in the derivative sense. His semantic trick also explains why he asserts that secondary qualities are merely powers to produce ideas in us and not real qualities in the body. The relevant secondary quality predicates apply to bodies only because they produce certain ideas in us.
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We have seen that Locke believes that his main argumentative burden in the chapter on primary and secondary qualities is to show that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble anything in bodies.
We should think of the more famous doctrine that secondary qualities are merely powers to produce ideas in us as a palliative measure in the face of the negative resemblance thesis-a semantic doctrine adopted to save the truth of ordinary judgments about secondary qualities.
Whatever consequences the resemblance theses have, it is worth knowing what they mean and why Locke believes them. In the detailed table of contents, he summarizes § §15-23 of the chapter on primary and secondary qualities with the line "Ideas of primary Qualities are resemblances; of secondary, not."
Most of the summaries in the table of contents are for single sections; nowhere else does Locke summarize so many sections with a single line. If we are to understand his purposes in these nine sections and in the chapter that contains them, we need to take this summary seriously. Which is to say, we need to take
Locke's resemblance theses seriously. 30 
